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I. INTRODUCTION
I am going to be discussing an ongoing project of mine that I call
hyperpartisan election law. I make three main arguments in this
project. The first is that almost all of election law was created during
an unusually nonpartisan period in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
Consistent with this period's very low level of partisanship, election
law originally did not intend to, and did not actually have the effect,
of addressing partisan cleavages. The second claim is that as the
country's voters and politicians have become ever more
partisan over the last generation, election law has adapted in two
distinctive ways. One, by sometimes going into dormancy, and so
not being available for litigants. Two, by being redirected to enable
it to tackle partisan grievances, only indirectly rather than directly.
The third claim is that neither of these two responses by election
law are really apt for our hyperpartisan modern moment. It would
be a lot better, in my view, for election law to tackle partisan intent
and partisan effect directly rather than indirectly.
I will try to convince you that American political history has gone
through three main phases. First, a long period, up through the
1950s, when voters and politicians were nearly as partisan as they
are today. Two, a very unusual era-in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s-when both voters and politicians were much more
nonpartisan. Third, another stretch occurs from the 1990s to today,
when the partisanship of both voters and politicians has risen to
unprecedented heights. Next, I will go through four separate
redistricting doctrines: one-person, one-vote; racial vote dilution;
racial gerrymandering; and partisan gerrymandering, and try to
show how each one corresponds to my thesis. My thesis, again, is
that election law used to make sense during the more nonpartisan
period in which it was formed, but its old doctrines are an
increasingly bad fit for our hyperpartisan present. In the broader
project I try to address all of election law, but because the
symposium is on redistricting I will only talk about redistricting
today.
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II. AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY
A. THE HYPERPARTISAN PAST: THE CIVIL WAR TO THE 1960S

Let's start with American political history and with the long era
of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth century. The first indicator I'll cover is voter loyalty over
time. This chart shows you the correlation between the county-level
presidential vote from one presidential election to the next.
Slide 1
The Hyperpartisan Past - Voter Loyalty Over Time 1
Persistence in Presidential Voting, 1860-2004

As you can see, for most of American history, from roughly the
Civil War until 1960, this correlation was very high-around 0.8 or
0.9. Voters' presidential votes or preferences in a given year were
extremely similar to their preferences in the previous election.

Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, Myths and Realities of American Political
Geography, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 119 (2006).
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Next, let's look at the frequency of ticket splitting in federal
elections-how often voters support the presidential candidate for
one party but a congressional candidate from the other party.
Slide 2
2
The Hyperpartisan Past - Ticket Splitting
45
40
'35

~A20

1952 195, 3190 196 1968 1971 1976 1986 1994 198 1992 1#" 2000 2004

Figure 1. President-House ticket splitting and partisan ambivalence, 1952-2004
Source: ANES data

This data only goes back to 1952, because that is when modern
opinion polling began. We do not have any ticket splitting data
before that. In the 1950s and early 1960s the rate of ticket splitting
was quite low. About 85% of voters consistently followed the party
line, and only about 15% of voters split their tickets.
The third indicator is incumbency advantage. This is the boost in
vote share that incumbent members of Congress receive relative to
non-incumbents. When the incumbency advantage is high, that
means that voters are paying attention to candidate-specific
attributes, not only to party. Conversely, when incumbency
advantage is low, that means that party predominates over
candidate-specific characteristics.

2 Kenneth Mulligan, PartisanAmbivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government,
32 POL. PSYCH. 505 (2011).
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Slide 3
3
The Hvnernartisan Past - Incumbency Advantage
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As you can see, the incumbency advantage was quite low in the
1950s and the early 1960s, according to several different measures.
In that period, the incumbency boost was only two or three
percentage points.
The last indicator is the polarization of members of Congresshow big the ideological gap is between the average Democrat and
the average Republican in Congress.

3 Gary C. Jacobson, It's Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in
U.S. House Elections, 77 J. POL. 861 (2015).
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From the late nineteenth century up until roughly the 1920s, the
ideological gap, or the level of polarization, was very high. The two
parties were ideologically quite distant. This was true both in the
House and in the Senate.
B. THE GOLDEN AGE OF NONPARTISANSHIP: THE 1960S, 1970S, AND
1980S

Simplifying a bit, you should now have a picture of both voters
and politicians as being very partisan for much of U.S. historycertainly the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth century. Next, let's see what happened in the 1960s,
the 1970s, and the 1980s, which is the period that I call the "Golden
Age" of nonpartisanship.
Let's start again with voter loyalty over time. You can see that
voter loyalty plummets in presidential elections, especially in the
1960s and the 1970s.

4 The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW
https://legacy.voteview.com/political-polarization-2015.htm

(Jan. 30,
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Slide 5
5
The Golden Aae - Voter Loyalty Over Time
Persistence in Presidential Voting, 1860-2004
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Suddenly, there are lots of voters who are willing to support one
party's presidential candidate in one election, and a different party's
candidate in the next election. For four straight elections, we get
year-to-year correlations around 0.2 or 0.3, which are vastly lower
than in the preceding century or so.
Next, with respect to ticket splitting in federal elections, you can
see that it was quite common in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, Myths and Realities of American Political
Geography, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 119 (2006).
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Slide 6
6
The Golden Age - Ticket Splitting
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Figure 1. Presidete-House ticket splitting and partisan ambivalence, 1952-2004.
Sousre: ANE.S data

About a quarter of voters, sometimes even more than a quarter,
would vote for one party's presidential candidate and the other
party's congressional candidate.
The third indicator is incumbency advantage. You can see that it
hovers around 8 or 9 points through the 1960s all the way through
the 1990s.

6 Kenneth Mulligan, PartisanAmbivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government,
32 POL. PSYCH. 505 (2011).
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Slide 7
The. Golden Ae . -

Incumbencv Advqnfgq

Figure 1. Three maseres of the kcumbeic avntiae, V92-2014

So here, the Golden Age persists a little bit longer than according
to some of the other metrics. That means that lots of voters in this
period were willing to support an incumbent congressional
candidate, even if that candidate would not have necessarily been
the voter's top partisan preference.
The fourth indicator is congressional polarization. You can see
that it was quite low in both the House and the Senate from the
1930s through the 1980s.

7 Gary C. Jacobson, It's Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in
U.S. House Elections, 77 J. POL. 861 (2015).
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The parties in this period were not all that ideologically distinct;
there is quite a bit of ideological overlap between the parties. Note
here that congressional polarization drops in the 1930s, which is
quite a bit before voter polarization drops in the 1960s. It turns out
that this is what always happens in American politics. Elites like
members of Congress tend to polarize or to depolarize first. Then,
those cues eventually filter down to ordinary voters who polarize or
depolarize a substantial amount of time after the elites. Now you
should have a picture of voters and politicians being quite
nonpartisan over this three-decade period of the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s. Certainly, it was much less partisan than the hundred years
before this period.
C. THE HYPERPARTISAN PRESENT: 1990S TO THE PRESENT

Let's look now at what happens over the last generation-from
the 1990s to today. Going back to voter loyalty, we see that it
returned to its historical levels.

8 The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW
https://legacy.voteview.com/political polarization-2015.htm

(Jan.
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Slide 9
Our Hyperpartisan Present - Voter Loyalty Over Time 9
Persistence in Presidential Voting, 1860-2004
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There is now a correlation of something like 0.9 between countylevel presidential election results in one year and what those results
were in the previous election. This chart only goes to 2004, but more
recently, the 2016 presidential election was actually more similar to
the 2012 presidential election than any pair of presidential elections
in more than a century.
Looking at ticket splitting next, the rate of ticket splitting in
federal elections fell to 17% or 18% in the 1990s and the early 2000s.
Since then, it has fallen quite a bit further. In 2012 and 2016, ticket
splitting was below 10% which is even lower than the previous
record lows in the 1950s.

9 Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A- Ward, Myths and Realities of American Political
Geography, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 119 (2006).
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Slide 10
Our Hyperpartisan Present - Ticket Splitting10
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Figure 1. Piesident-House ticket splitting ad partisan ambivalence, 1952-2004.

Some: ANES da

With the incumbency advantage, we have the same story. It has
tumbled in the 2000s and the 2010s, according to all the different
metrics that we have of the incumbency edge. The boost that
incumbents now receive is down to 3 or 4 points, which is pretty
close, maybe still slightly above, what it was in the 1950s.

10 Kenneth Mulligan, PartisanAmbivalence, Split-Ticket Voting, and Divided Government,
32 POL. PSYCH. 505 (2011).
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That means that today's voters are not very interested in a
candidate's incumbency. They are much more concerned about the
candidate's party affiliation.
Lastly, the polarization of members of Congress has also risen to
what are now unprecedented heights. It is notable that in every
single year, since about 1980, congressional polarization has gone
up. There is now zero ideological overlap between any House
Democrat and any House Republican, or between any Senate
Democrat and any Senate Republican.

11 Gary C. Jacobson, It's Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in
U.S. House Elections, 77 J. POL. 861 (2015).
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III. ELECTION LAW DEVELOPMENT

The link between this empirical history and election law will be
the subject of the rest of my talk. I will try to show you that several
redistricting doctrines were formed in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,
and that they really made sense in that period, given the era's
unusually low level of partisanship. Then I will try to show you that
all of these doctrines have adapted to our more hyperpartisan
present, either by going into remission or by being redirected to
regulate partisan abuses indirectly. Neither of these responses is
really ideal in my view.
A. ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE

Let's start with one-person, one-vote. This is the rule that
districts have to have approximately the same population. Oneperson, one-vote was announced in the 1960s in cases like Reynolds

12 The
Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW
https://legacy.voteview.com/political-polarization_2015.htm

(Jan.
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v. Sims. 3 And when the Court announced one-person, one-vote, the
Court was pretty frank that what it was really concerned with was
this pattern in which rural districts were underpopulated and
overrepresented, and urban districts were overpopulated and
underrepresented, both in Congress and in state legislatures. The
Court tells us in Reynolds that "apportionment controversies are
generally viewed as involving urban-rural conflicts.... [T]he thrust
of [ ] malapportionment . . . [is the] underrepresentation of urban
and suburban areas."'4 The Court is also pretty frank in this period
that it does not expect one-person, one-vote to do anything about
partisan abuses of districting. The Court says in 1983 that oneperson, one-vote "does little to prevent what is known as
gerrymandering." It "is far less ambitious than what would be
required to address gerrymandering."5
Not only is the intent of the Court behind one-person, one-vote
nonpartisan, so is the effect of the doctrine. That is because you have
Republicans gaining in the South, where the overpopulated rural
districts were predominately Democratic, but you also have
Democrats gaining in the Midwest and the Northeast, where the
overrepresented rural districts were predominately Republican.
Nationwide, those Democratic gains in the Northeast and Midwest
are pretty much offset by the Republican gains in the South. So
nationwide, neither party benefits from the one-person, one-vote
revolution.
Fast forward now to the hyperpartisan present. For about two
decades, we saw what I call the "dormancy response" to
hyperpartisanship. There were very few one-person, one-vote cases
filed from the mid 1980s to the mid 2000s, and even fewer oneperson, one-vote cases succeeded in this period. That is basically
because states learned that to avoid liability, all one had to do was
design districts with small population deviations. But then, in Cox
v. Larios, we suddenly have the Court striking down a Georgia map
with small (sub 10%) population deviations because that map
"systematically
underpopulated"
Democratic
districts and
6
overpopulated Republican districts.' Then, we have the Court
confirming in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
1' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14 Id.
at 567 n.43.
15 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 n.6 (1983).
16 Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
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Commission that small-below 10%-population deviations are
unconstitutional if their "predominant motivation" is "to secure
political advantage for one party."' 7 This is a quintessential example
of what I will call the "repackaging response" to hyperpartisanship,
where the Court uses an originally nonpartisan doctrine to try to
fight partisan gerrymandering.
Slide 13
One Person. One Vote - Our HvnerDartisan Present1 8
Legislative districts, ordered by population deviation

4.4

0

-4%

This chart here shows you the pattern of Republican district
overpopulation, and Democratic district underpopulation in Harris.
This is the kind of pattern that is now open to attack on one-person,
one-vote grounds.
B. RACIAL VOTE DILUTION

The next topic I will cover is racial vote dilution. This is the
doctrine that says that both under the Constitution, and under § 2

17

Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015).

18 Evan Wyloge, Supreme Court Scrutinizes GOP Challenge to Arizona Legislative Map,
TUSCON SENTINEL (Dec. 8 2015) http://www.tucsonsentinel.comlocal/report/120815

az

redistricting/supreme-court-scrutinizes-gop-challenge-arizona-legislative-map/
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of the Voting Rights Act, it is illegal to dilute the electoral influence
of minority voters. 9 The Court announces the constitutional theory
of vote dilution in 1973, right in the middle of the Golden Age of
nonpartisanship. So it is not a surprise, given the era, that the
theory addresses race only and has nothing to do with party. The
court defines vote dilution in White v. Regester as "invidiously"
cancelling out or minimizing the strength of racial groups.2" It is the
same story in 1986 in Thornburg v. Gingles, when the Court lays
out how the statutory theory of vote dilution is going to operate. 2 '
The Court says that vote dilution is what happens when some
electoral practice "caus[es] an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives."2 2 The Court does not say a word about party in
Gingles, just as it did not in White beforehand.
Not only was the Court's motivation nonpartisan when it
constructed the doctrine of vote dilution, so was the impact of the
doctrine. You can see in these two charts that, courtesy of the new
doctrine of vote dilution, black representation in Southern state
legislatures went up significantly in the 1970s and 1980s.

19
20
21
22

Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 47.
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Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2016).
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But, as you can see in the second chart, Democrats retained their
super-majority control of all of the Southern state legislatures in
this period. The share of Democratic seats in the South never
dropped below 70% in the 1970s and 1980s. You basically had black
Democrats replacing white Democrats in the state legislatures, but
Republican candidates were pretty much still excluded from office
in this period.
What happens to vote dilution in our hyperpartisan present?
First, we see the same dormancy response that we saw in the oneperson, one-vote context. The number of § 2 cases filed per year has
dropped steadily since the early 1990s. The success rate of § 2 suits
has actually dropped steadily since 1982 itself, which is when § 2
was enacted into law. This decline in § 2 success rate has been
noticeable among both Democratic and Republican appointed
judges; it is not a partisan phenomenon. The chart here shows how
the success rate in § 2 suits has been declining since the 1980s both
when there are Democratic judges and also Republican judges.
Slide 15
Racial Vote Dilution - Our Hyperpartisan Present
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Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judgingthe Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1

(2008).
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We also have seen the repackaging response, in particular in
LULAC v. Perry in 2006.25 In LULAC, Texas redrew a congressional
district that was about to vote out its Latino Republican
representative. The Court conceded that Texas's motive in
redrawing this district was probably partisan. Texas probably was
not aiming at harming Latino voters. Nevertheless, the Court says
that there is vote dilution. Even if the state's action was taken
primarily for political, non-racial reasons, it still was damaging to
the Latinos in the district.
C. RACIAL GERRYMANDERING
The next doctrine is racial gerrymandering, which is the drawing
of districts with race as the predominant motivation for the contours
of the district lines. This doctrine was actually recognized by the
Court in 1993, which is just after the Golden Age of
nonpartisanship. Racial gerrymandering does not fit my thesis
perfectly, but I still think the match is good enough. When the Court
explains what racial gerrymandering is, in Shaw v. Reno and Miller
v. Johnson, most famously, the Court does so entirely in racial and
nonpartisan terms.2 6 Racial gerrymandering is "the deliberate
segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race."2 7
A violation is established if race was the "predominant factor" that
motivated the legislature's decision to construct a given district.2 8
Again, not only is the Court's intent nonpartisan when it creates
racial gerrymandering doctrine, so is the effect of the doctrine, at
least in the short run. Democrats did a lot of what the courts later
held was unlawful racial gerrymandering in 1991, when they
redrew a whole bunch of districts in the South. Yet the Democrats
held on to both those racially gerrymandered districts and most
other Southern districts in the 1992 election. So, the racial
gerrymandering did not have a partisan consequence in the first
election held after the line drawing occurred. Although, clearly after
the Republican revolution of 1994, the story gets a bit more
complicated in the South.

25
26
27
28

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 917.
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More generally, as this chart shows, there is no necessary
negative relationship between drawing more minority opportunity
districts, whether that is through racial gerrymandering or through
legal redistricting means, and then how many seats Democrats are
winning in the state legislature.
Slide 16
Racial Gerrymandering - (Just After) The Golden Age 29
Predicted Democratic State House Seat Shares for Different Minority State
House Seat Shares

0%

-

5%

10%
15%
20%
25%
Minority State House Seat Share
Non-Unified Control
- -"
Unified Democratic Control
Unified Republican Control

Predictions shown separately for scenarios of nonunified control over redistricting,
unified Democratic control, and unified Republican control. All other variables held at
their means.

In particular, when Democrats are the ones who are in charge of
redistricting (as they were in the South in the 1990s when all these
cases originated) there is only a slight relationship between
minority seat share and Democratic seat share in a state
legislature. Democrats get a big boost over other redistricting
configurations for every single possible level of minority seat share
in the legislature.

29 Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2016).
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Once again, fast forward to our hyperpartisan present. As with
the other doctrines I have mentioned, there again was a dormancy
response in racial gerrymandering law in the 2000s. Especially after
Easley v. Cromartiewas decided by the Supreme Court, many fewer
racial gerrymandering cases were filed and many fewer succeeded
as well.3" That is because under Cromartie, states were able to
defend themselves against racial gerrymandering challenges by
arguing that their predominant motivation for drawing certain
districts was partisanadvantage-that was a winning argument in
a lot of litigation.
Then, in the last few years, we have seen a quintessential
repackaging response in racial gerrymandering law. Increasingly,.
we have seen the doctrine being used to strike down districts that
clearly are part of a partisan gerrymander. This first happened in
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, with Alabama's state legislative
districts.3 It happened again in Bethune-Hill with Virginia's state
legislative districts.3 2 Then, most dramatically, the Court said in
Cooper v. Harrisjust last year that "if legislators use race as their
predominant districting criterion, with the end goal of advancing
their partisan interest, their action still triggers strict scrutiny."3 3
This is almost exactly the opposite of what the Court said in
Cromartie fifteen years ago. It means that racial gerrymandering
doctrine can now be used to attack partisan gerrymandering
whenever race and party are intertwined. Of course, race and party
are very often intertwined, especially in the South, which is where
all of these recent racial gerrymandering cases have come from.

30 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).

Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
33 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
31
32
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Slide 17
34
Racial Gerrymandering - Our Hyperpartisan Present

Racial Gerrymandering Cases by Cycle

II
1990s

20
2000s

13 Total Cases

2010s

a Successful Cases

The chart shows the decline in racial gerrymandering litigation
and successful racial gerrymandering cases between the 1990s and
the period afterward. Although, note the modest but still visible
spike in racial gerrymandering successes in the current cycle.
D. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING

The final doctrine
is partisan gerrymandering. Our
hyperpartisan present would seem to require judicial intervention
to address what is obviously the most glaring, most deep and
powerful cleavage in American politics today. Before getting to the
present, I will say a few words about partisan gerrymandering in
the 1980s-still in the Golden Age of nonpartisanship.
This is when the Court recognizes the doctrine for the first time
in Davis v. Bandemer in 1986. 3" Importantly, for my purposes, the
Court announces a standard in Bandemer that nobody is ever able
to satisfy. The Court requires the consistent degradation of a "group
of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."36 Every
single challenge under the Bandemer standard fails. There are
Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (2016).
35 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
3
Id. at 132.
34
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about thirty of these lawsuits in total. Every suit is defeated
ultimately.
The reason all of these challenges failed is because the Court's
"consistent degradation" requirement meant that you had to show
a disadvantage over multiple elections-a durable handicap in
order to establish liability. Also, the Court's "political process as a
whole" requirement meant that you needed to show more than just
abuses of line drawing; you also had to show things like
disenfranchisement, voter suppression, and efforts to stop voters
from nominating their preferred candidates. Those kinds of
activities, although unfortunately happening today, were not very
common in the 1980s under the Bandemer standard.
Most scholars who support judicial intervention on partisan
gerrymandering grounds regret all of the cases that were lost under
the Bandemer standard. Let me suggest, though, that the courts
may have been right not to get involved with partisan
gerrymandering in this period-still in the Golden Age of
nonpartisanship. One reason why judicial intervention may have
been unwise back then is that there simply were not too many
extreme partisan gerrymanders in that period. This chart shows
you the average efficiency gap of congressional plans from 1972 to
the present.
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Partisan Gerrymandering - The Golden Age
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You can see that the 1980s had the lowest average efficiency gap
of any decade since the one-person, one-vote revolution. There
simply were not a lot of severe gerrymanders in effect in the 1980s.

37 Simon Jackman Expert Rep., LWVNC v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 18,
2017).
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Slide 19
- The Golden Age38
Gerrymandering
Partisan
Table 4. The persistence of bias: correlation between a plan's first and
subsequent efficiency gaps
State Legislative

Congressional

1970s

0.562**

0.350*

1980s

0.696***

0.089

1990s

0.746***

0.144

2000s

0.735***

0.591***

2010s

0.770***

0.823***

This table shows that gerrymanders in the 1980s were also not
very durable. The correlation in the 1980s between a congressional
map's first efficiency gap and its subsequent efficiency gaps was
extremely low-only something like 0.09, which is barely any
connection whatsoever. In this era of mild and transient
gerrymanders, maybe it was a good idea for the courts to do what
they did and not intervene. Why were the gerrymanders in the
1980s so weak and ephemeral? There are two answers. For one,
there was less sophisticated mapmaking technology in the 1980s.
The second explanation was probably, as we saw earlier, that voters
were a lot more volatile in their partisan preferences in the 1980s.
It is much tougher to design a durable gerrymander if you cannot
effectively predict voter behavior. These predictions were really
hard in the 1980s when voters swung pretty significantly from one
party to the other.
Finally, let's turn to partisan gerrymandering in our own
hyperpartisan present. Pretty obviously, we have only seen a
dormancy response in this area until very recently. Just as every
single claim failed under the Bandemer standard, every single claim
also failed after Vieth and LULAC up until the Whitford decision in

38 Eric McGhee et al., The Role of PartisanGerrymanderingin U.S. Elections (May 2018)
(working paper) (on file with author).
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November 2016.1' That was the first victory in a partisan
gerrymandering challenge in federal court since Bandemer itself. I
mentioned Vieth, which is decided by the Court firmly in our present
hyperpartisan period. Vieth is interesting for many reasons, but one
reason is that the Court seems to ignore today's hyperpartisanship.
The Court seems to imagine that we are still living in the Golden
Age of nonpartisanship. The Vieth Court tells us that "political
affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from
one election to the next."4 But we saw earlier that, in fact, today's
voters almost never change their partisan preferences from one
election to the next. They almost never split their tickets. They
could, in theory, but they do not. The Vieth Court also tells us that
it cannot decide whether it is better to elect more moderate
representatives or a smaller number of extreme representatives.
Again, this is an interesting theoretical dilemma, but in practice it
is not a dilemma at all because the reason we have unprecedented
congressional polarization today is that almost every single
congressional member is a consistent party follower. We do not have
many moderates in Congress today. So, this choice between some
number of moderate representatives and some other number of
extreme representatives may have been a legitimate dilemma in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but these days, there is not a choice. Your
only option with representation is extreme representation.

39 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Gill v. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis.
2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
40
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Furthermore, the same evidence that suggested that the Court
may have been right not to intervene in the 1980s is now screaming
that judicial intervention is actually necessary. The average
efficiency gap of district plans has spiked in the current cycle to the
highest level in modern history-since the one-person, one-vote
revolution.
Slide 20
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41 Simon Jackman Expert Rep., LWVNC v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 18,
2017).
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Slide 21
42
Partisan Gerrymandering- Our Hyperpartisan Present

Table 4. The persistence of bias: correlatio between a plan's first and
subsequent effl
¢acy
gXps

Staite Legislative
1970ss

Congressional
O. O*

1980S

.96*

0,0"

1990s

0.746'*

0.144

2000s

0.730

0591"

2010s

0.770*

0.623'

We have seen an average gap of twice the level in this cycle that
we observed in the 1980s. When it comes to the durability of
gerrymanders, that has also gone through the roof in the current
cycle. There is now something like a 0.8 correlation between a plan's
first efficiency gap and its subsequent efficiency gaps in future
elections. This is as compared to essentially no correlation at all in
the 1980s. Now, we have partisan gerrymanders that are
dramatically more extreme and more persistent than they used to
be just a generation ago. If these facts do not call out for judicial
intervention, I do not know what facts would.

42 Eric McGhee et al., The Role of PartisanGerrymanderingin U.S. Elections (May 2018)
(working paper) (on file with author).
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